

Unjust-Debt Waiver Struggle



"Struggle for exemption from unjust debt"

ABOUT SAMPARK

Sampark M.P., a voluntary organisation is striving for participatory socio-economic development of the tribals and weaker sections of Jhabua district since last two decades. Its activities are focussed mainly on the issues related to self dependency of the villagers, revival of their positive social traditions, freedom from their age old conventions, vocational education, health, livelihood, and conservation of natural resources like water and soil.

Sampark, during preceding years, has worked at many levels to empower the marginal farmers, tribals and economically weaker and deprived sections of the tribal area of western Madhya Pradesh. It has also created awareness amongst the villagers about proper implementation of employment guarantee act, exemption from unjust debt, prevention of commercialisation of water, participatory conservation of natural resources and genetic engineering onslaught on Indian agriculture etc. This work is still going on for the benefit of the common people.



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SAMPARK

Madhyapradesh

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PREFACE

The Fifth Schedule of the Indian Constitution has exemplary provisions that take cognisance of the special socio-economic and cultural situation of adivasis that if implemented properly can ensure peace and good governance in adivasi areas in the country. Many laws, rules and policies have also been promulgated to enhance this protective function that the state is supposed to provide to the adivasis. However, the tragedy is that these provisions have rarely been implemented and so the adivasis have not only lost out on modern development but have also had to bear its costs. During the late 1980s and early 1990s the district administration in Jhabua implemented numerous community lift irrigation schemes which were ill designed due to lack of sufficient environmental knowledge on the part of the designers and badly implemented due to a corrupt nexus between government officials, bank staff and contractors.

The net result was that the poor beneficiary adivasis were saddled with huge debts on the loans that were given to them for the schemes which never operated. When the banks wrongly began to pressurise the adivasis to pay back these debts they decided to organise and protest under the aegis of the Lok Jagriti Manch and with the support of SAMPARK. They used a rule promulgated under the provisions of the Fifth Schedule which stipulated that adivasis who were not to blame for the failure of a scheme that had been ill planned and badly implemented could not be burdened with the loans that had been taken out in their names. After a long drawn battle, the adivasis have succeeded in getting these loans waived. An impact analysis of this epic struggle using Logical Framework Analysis is presented here so as to document the whole process as a learning tool for others.

Nilesh Desai

1. Introduction

The month of February 2006 saw hundreds of Bhil adivasi indigenous people from Jhabua district organised under the banner of their mass organisation "Lok Jagriti Manch" sitting in a dharna or sit-in in Bhopal the capital city of Madhya Pradesh state in India demanding that the unjust recovery of loans advanced to them by financial institutions for lift irrigation schemes that had failed due to no fault of their own be stopped. They said they had conclusive proof to support their claim that the lift irrigation schemes had been based on faulty water resource planning arising from treating water not as a source of life as the Bhils had done for ages but as a source of profit as modern man had begun to do after independence in India. Indeed globally the commoditisation of water and the resultant unsustainability of its use has led to the problem of serious water scarcity, which is becoming more acute with time and the present instance was an example of this retrograde phenomenon (Cosgrove & Rijsberman, 2000).

Eventually after ten days the Government of Madhya Pradesh partially yielded to their demands staying the recovery of the loans and ordering a detailed investigation into their claims. Continuous mass campaigning and lobbying pressure applied thereafter by Lok Jagriti Manch and its support Sampark led to this unjust debt being waived a year later in 2007. This was the first time in the history of independent India that unpaid development loans of adivasis had been waived as a result of a sustained rights campaign. An impact analysis of this unique rights campaign has been carried out here to bring out the learnings and systematise them for future replication on a larger scale.

1.1 Organisational Profile

The organisation SAMPARK was started 1987 in Petlawad tehsil of Jhabua district as a unit of the Social Work and Rural Centre (SWRC), Tilonina, Rajasthan and was formally registered in 1990 as a society

under the Societies Registration Act. The choice of the area of work was made on the basis of the nature and intensity of exploitation of the adivasi, negligible amelioratory developmental intervention and the limited presence of voluntary groups. Work was started by addressing the survival needs and developmental aspirations of the people. SAMPARK has gradually evolved into a many faceted organisation by solving the many problems that have arisen out of local situations. Two decisions were made about the target and mode of work.

- i. All work would be done only with the weaker sections of society.
- ii. A participatory approach would be adopted for all programme formulation and implementation.

Consequently the programmes of the organisation have been substantive learning opportunities for both the staff and the participant communities for the development of interactive appropriate solutions to local problems rather than a blind implementation of centralised schemes of the government and international agencies. The activities have been carried out in the spheres of awareness building and developmental work.

The organisation laid stress on forming local youth groups and training them in street theatre and puppetry. The groups used these media to generate discussion among the people about the problems of the area and the importance of organised political and community action for finding solutions to them. These efforts were useful in building a rapport with the people and in establishing an identity. Men's and women's organisations were formed in every target village and gram koshes or village funds were constituted. People began to collectively talk about social evils like high bride price and expensive rites of passage and find solutions to them and they also built up a mass organisation to tackle the many rights violations called the "Lok Jagriti Manch". The Manch has developed into a fullfledged community organisation, building pressure about the issues like advocacy of interests of the populace of the area, conducting mutual-conflicts-

settlement groups (caste panchayats), revival of positive traditions of the tribal society, eradication of social evils and proper implementation of government welfare schemes

1.2 Methodology of Impact Analysis

Currently the accepted methodology for conducting an impact analysis is that of logical framework or log-frame analysis (LFA), which provides a set of assessment tools that, when applied creatively, can be utilised for evaluating rights campaigns. The purpose of LFA is to undertake an objectives oriented assessment that can evaluate the impact of a rights campaign. The LFA that has been done here includes -

1.2.1 Situation Analysis -

this detailed description and analysis provides

- i. an overview of the socio-economic characteristics of the area where the campaign has been conducted.
- ii. an analysis of the various stakeholders and their inter-relationship in the campaign area both historically and at present.
- iii. an analysis of the various problems that have been addressed by the campaign.
- iv. an objectives analysis that sets out the goals of the campaign and the means by which it has tried to achieve them.

1.2.2 Strategy Analysis

This analysis follows the problems and objectives analysis and sets out the strategy that has been adopted to achieve the desired results. In addition to examining the logic of the interventions planned this analysis also looks at their practical feasibility.

1.2.3 Measurement of Impact

This sets out the impact of the project measured in terms of various indicators of performance.

1.2.4 Project Evaluation Matrix

This provides a one-page summary of-

- i. Why a project has been carried out (what are the goals)
- ii. What the project has achieved (utilisation of services)
- iii. How the project has achieved its outputs/results (strategies adopted)
- iv. What have been the results of the project (impact)
- v. Which external factors have influenced the success and failures of the project (risks and frame conditions)

1.2.5 Future Plans

This sets out the future plans of Sampark and the Lok Jagriti Manch.

2. Situation Analysis

Situation Analysis consists of Area Characteristics Analysis, Stakeholder Analysis, Problem Analysis and Objectives Analysis in that order so as to arrive at a thorough understanding of the area specific situational parameters that have influenced the rights campaign that has been conducted.

2.1 Area Characteristics Analysis

The district of Jhabua situated in the south-western corner of Madhya Pradesh is home to the Bhil adivasi or indigenous people with the various sub-tribes like Bhil, Bhilala, Patelia and Mankar together constituting 86.8 % of the total population (Census, 2001). The campaign area is situated in Petlawad tehsil of Jhabua district where the proportion of adivasi population is comparatively less and is 76% only. The district lies in the Vindhya hill ranges to the south of the Malwa plateau and the land is hilly without much tree cover and prone to heavy erosion. Petlawad tehsil is drained by the Mahi river which forms the northern boundary of the district. The topsoils with some

fertile patches of the medium black variety. The underlying rock structure is mostly archaean igneous with some hard rock, deccan trap basaltic and sedimentary formations in patches. The first two formations have low primary porosity and permeability and so the groundwater aquifers have poor water retention capacity. While the deccan trap and sedimentary formations are better aquifers they are few and far between (GOMP, 2002). Thus the terrain and the underlying geological structure together result in most of the average annual rainfall of 829 mm running off during the monsoons and consequently the net groundwater availability is only 519 million cubic meters per year (CGWB, 2006). The area falls in the Malwa plateau agroclimatic zone having some patches of medium to black medium soils in the plains areas with medium levels of the three main nutrients of Nitrogen, Phosphorus and Potassium. Most of the topsoils in the wider hilly areas are light and lateritic.

The better quality lands in the tehsil are held mostly by the non-advasis while the 76 % majority advasis have the lower quality lands which are mostly unirrigated and lie in the upper watershed regions. Thus the break up of crop production for the whole Petlawad tehsil shown in Fig. 1 above does not adequately reflect the crop mix of the advasis which has a higher proportion of cereals and pulses and less of cotton, oilseeds and fodder. Unfortunately disaggregated data showing this difference is not available in collated form with the government.




Fig. 1: Cropping Pattern of Petlawad Tehsil in %

Source : District Statistical Handbook 2006, Department of Economics and Statistics, GOMP

The major problem in the area is that there is extreme fragmentation of land, as is evident from the data given in Table 1 below. This data in fact does not reflect the actual reality because the landholdings are in the name of old people and the ground situation is that the sons have divided the land of their father among themselves. This land hunger has led to the encroachment of government common lands and so the actual proportion of such lands is much less than shown on government records. So only the absolutely barren land is left and is grazed by cattle. The forest area is very small. The irrigated area is about 30% mostly through small pump irrigation.

Table 1: Landuse Pattern in Petlawad Tehsil

Arable Land Per Household (Ha)	Arable Land (%)	Revenue Common Land (%)	Forest Land (%)	Irrigated Land (%)
1.14	55	40	5	30

Source: District Statistical Handbook 2006, Department of Economics and Statistics, GOMP

The yields of crops in the tehsil are shown in Fig. 2 below and as is evident these are below the national average. The yields are even lower for the adivasis who have the lower quality lands and also less capital investments in them.




Fig 2 : Crop Yields in Petlawad Tehsil in Qu./Ha

Source : District Statistical Handbook 2006, Department of Economics and Statistics, GOMP

Some Human Development Indicators for Jhabua district along with its rank among the forty five districts of Madhya Pradesh are given below in Table 2. Clearly the district is backward as it has the worst Human Development Index among all the districts. The poverty ranking is not that bad because the people migrate to nearby developed areas and earn supplementary incomes. However, since the status of education and health are very poor and get aggravated further due to migration, the overall human development situation is a cause for concern. The per capita food production ranking is high because the proportion of rural population is as high as 91% who are mostly engaged in agriculture. The high total fertility rate is an indicator of the high levels of patriarchy suffered by women in the district which is also confirmed by the low Gender Development Index.

Table 2 : Selected Human Development Indicators for Jhabua District

No.	Indicator	Value	Rank Among 45 Districts
1.	Human Development Index	0.372	45
2.	Gender Development Index	0.450	43
3.	Population Dependent on Agriculture (%)	90.62	
4.	Infant Mortality Rate	130	42
5.	Life Expectancy (2001)	55.8	30
6.	Total Fertility Rate	7.0	45
7.	Below Poverty Line (%)	31.2	20
8.	Annual Per Capita Food Production (kgs)268.22	21	

Source: Third Human Development Report Madhya Pradesh 2002, GOMP.

The location of the area of work of Sampark in the northern part of Jhabua district is shown in the map of Madhya Pradesh given in Fig 3 below. It is quite evident that geographically the area is remote from the centres of administration and political power in the state and this has been a major factor in its neglect leading to its low development performance in comparison to other areas. The connectivity by road too is poor. Even though the main Delhi to Mumbai rail line grazes the northern part of the district there has not been any significant economic development along it.

2.2 Stakeholder Analysis

The analysis of the relationships between the various stakeholders in the campaign area has been carried out in two phases. First a brief history of the western Madhya Pradesh region has been detailed to underline the historical development of these relations. After that the current situation in the region has been analysed so as to be able to draw the local stakeholder tree.

2.2.1 History of Western Madhya Pradesh

Traditionally the Bhils lived by practising shifting cultivation, hunting and gathering in the dense forests that used to cover the terrain. A combination of the reduction of the fertility of their farms and epidemics would cause them to move every few years to new locations. Living at subsistence levels and being heavily dependent on physical labour they had no alternative to being integrated into tightly knit communities by customs of labour pooling in most aspects of their material and cultural life. The egalitarianism of the Bhils, apart from the usual patriarchal aberration, was further ensured by customs that decreed that surpluses accumulated beyond a certain limit be spent on communal merrymaking and feasting. This also did away with the possibility of these surpluses being used to develop agricultural and artisanal production and engage in trade and further accumulation and so protected the environment from over exploitation (Rahul,

1997). This aversion to trade also meant that they eschewed the abstractions of literacy and numeracy and remained firmly down to earth and developed a rich oral animistic culture with nature at its centre. Thus there was no commercial value attached to natural resources and especially water. The terrain and the kind of agriculture they practised discouraged the development of irrigation. Nevertheless using their own ingenuity the Bhils developed an unique irrigation system that involved the construction of temporary weirs on the hilly streams and then the diversion of water into channels with lesser gradients that over a distance of a few kilometres brought the water into their small farms by gravity (Rahul, 1996).

The destruction of the Bhils' agricultural base and their loss of control over the crucial natural resources of land, water and forests in the western Madhya Pradesh region in fact, have a long history. Under pressure from the Mughals and the Rajputs from the sixteenth century onwards they had first to give up the more fertile lands of the Malwa plateau and Nimar plains bordering the lower Narmada river valley and recede into the forested hills to cultivate sub-optimal lands. This process gained in momentum with the increase in trade and settled agriculture as more and more forests on the plains were cleared and brought under the plough. The British accelerated this transformation by laying railway lines from the decade of the 1860s and thus opening up these areas further to trade and the penetration by sahumars or moneylender traders who also doubled as tax collectors into the remotest regions. The loss of access to forests and agricultural lands, the burden of heavy taxes and the exploitation of the sahumars had destituted the Bhils even prior to independence (Banerjee, 2003).

Unfortunately this colonial insensitiveness towards the adivasis persisted even after independence leading to massive displacement and immiserisation of the adivasis. A fairly well established fact today is that the institutions set up under the provisions of the Constitution of India for the protection of the adivasis have not functioned properly.

The most powerful such institution is the Tribal Advisory Council to be set up in each state under the provisions of the Fifth Schedule of the constitution. This council, which is to be constituted from the adivasi members of the legislative assembly of the state can advise the Governor to institute policies for the protection and development of the adivasis. Another institution is that of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Commission. Additionally enabling laws and policies enacted from time to time like the statute to prevent misappropriation of adivasi land by non-advasis too have not been implemented in an effective manner. This has been primarily due to the wrong development policies adopted by the state, which have tended to strengthen rather than weaken the political and economic power of the non-advasis vis-à-vis the adivasis. For example the policy of rapid modern industrial development has meant that adivasi habitats have been acquired for mining, commercial forestry and big dam building without adequate compensation or alternative livelihood sources being provided to those displaced.

It is to be noted here that Madhya Pradesh is itself part of the central Indian **Bimaru** group of poor states consisting of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. It is generally acknowledged that considering all aspects of social, economic and human development the four southern Indian states of Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala are ahead of the rest of India. Thus these southern states have caught up with the economic powerhouse states like Punjab, Maharashtra and Gujarat in economic development too on the basis of their greater social and human capital. Naturally the southern states are way ahead of the poor Bimaru states in all respects. The population of the state of Tamil Nadu is more or less the same as that of Madhya Pradesh while it is considerably smaller in geographic size and poorer in natural resource endowment compared to the latter. Selected economic and human development indicators of the two states given in Table 3 below show the extent to which the latter is

lagging behind the former because of the poor quality of its human capital.

Table 3 : Selected Development Indicators for Tamil Nadu & M.P.

No.	Indicator	Tamil Nadu	Madhyapradesh
1.	Population (2001)	62,110,839	60,385,118
2.	Net State Domestic Product Per Capita 1999-2000 (Rs)	19,141	10,907
3.	Credit/Deposit Ratio 2001 (%)	90.6	52.5
4.	Public & Private Investment 2001 (Crore Rs)	1,63,303	44,001
5.	Public & Private Investment 2001 Per Capita (Rs)	26,292.19	7,286.73
6.	Planned Government Expenditure 2001-02 (Crore Rs)	5200	3937
7.	Credit Utilisation 2001 (Crore Rs)	57,106.8	15,264.2
8.	Population Below Official Poverty Line 1999-2000 (%)	20.6	37.1
9.	Tax/NSDP Ratio 1998-99 (%)	9.1	6.3
10.	Road Length 1993-94 (kms/ 1000 sq. kms)	1434	309
11.	Mechanisation of Agriculture 1993-94 (HP/1000Ha)	1143.3	248.8
12.	Rural Sex Ratio 1992-93 (females/ 1000 males)	1001	901
13.	Infant Mortality 1992-93 (per 1000 live births)	67.7	85.2
14.	Total Fertility Rate 1992-93	2.48	3.90
15.	Literacy 2001 (%)	73.5	64.1
16.	UNDP Human Development Index 2001	0.531	0.394
17.	UNDP Gender Development Index 2001	0.81	0.54

Source: Third Human Development Report Madhya Pradesh - 2002, GOMP, Census 2001,

GOI, "Infrastructure in India",1996, Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, Mumbai, Report of Perspective Planning Division 2001, Planning Commission, GOI, "Statistical Abstract of India",1997, Central Statistical Organisation, GOI, Human Development Report, 2001, United Nations Development Programme, National Family Health Survey 1, 1991-92, International Institute of Population Sciences, Mumbai.

No wonder then that the economic and human development indices of the Bhil adivasis of western Madhya Pradesh as seen earlier are the lowest in a state that is itself in very bad shape in comparison to the more developed states of the country.

2.2.2 Current Situation

Following on the national policy in this regard the concentration of government finances after independence on industrialisation and the promotion of green revolution agriculture on the more fertile lands belonging to non-*adivasi* farmers in the river valleys (NCAER, 1963) to the neglect of the much wider dryland areas of the *Bhils* in the upper watersheds has further skewed the resource access pattern of the region against them. The benefits of the green revolution were cornered by the *sahukars*, who traded in the inputs and the increased output and also made super profits from lending at usurious interest rates. The large farmers too benefited immensely by earning huge surpluses from low production costs due to state subsidised supply of inputs and the use of their extra-economic powers over the *adivasi* to keep wage levels depressed (Banerjee, op cit). The lack of state support for research and development of indigenous crops suitable to the harsh topographies of the *Bhil* homelands has further weakened their economic base. Thus the *Bhil adivasi* have remained in the clutches of *sahukars* who dominate the rural markets of the region exploiting the former through un-remunerative prices for their produce, exorbitant prices for the agricultural inputs and usurious interest rates on loans advanced to them (Aurora, 1972). Consequently most of the *Bhil adivasi* peasants have to rely on migration either permanent or seasonal to make ends meet (Mosse et al, 2002). This in turn means that

their labour which is the only asset that they have and which was previously being used on their farms is now being expended in building the assets of other people in other areas which are already better developed adding to the injustice to the Bhils.

Matters have been compounded by the state having also failed to provide good and adequate education services resulting in the Bhil adivasis remaining unequipped to negotiate the complexities of the modern system of governance into which they have been forcefully integrated. The poverty induced by these wrong development policies has adversely affected the nutritional levels of the food intake of the adivasis and combined with the lack of good and cheap health services has led to a decline in their health. Moreover the even greater lack of both education and health services for the women has meant that they have not been able to smash age-old patriarchal structures and their consequent lack of reproductive rights has led to a population explosion putting further pressure on scarce resources. All these factors have combined to produce a scenario wherein adivasis are being continually exploited by the improper functioning of the modern market system, which has increasingly penetrated into their subsistence lifestyles and being forced to live in bondage to non-*adivasi* *sahukars* who have become economically very powerful over the years.

Thus eventhough there are reservations for the adivasis which ensure that all the electoral positions for government from the village upto the central level in a Fifth Schedule district like Jhabua are reserved for them, the apparatus of the political parties which fight these elections is dominated by the non-*adivasi* *sahukars*. In the prevailing situation in which elections for the post of a *sarpanch* too require a successful candidate to spend around twentyfive thousand rupees on an average it can well be imagined that the adivasi candidates for the elections of members of the Vidhan Sabha and Lok Sabha have to rely heavily on the party apparatus dominated by these *sahukars*. It is not surprising

therefore that the elected adivasi representatives of all hues and at all levels subsequently act to further the interests of these sahuks at the cost of the poor common adivasis and the condition of the latter continues to deteriorate.

The Bhils have not only lost their natural resource bases but with the undermining of their subsistence agriculture based lifestyle that this has led to, they have lost confidence in their own culture too. Poverty has led to community links breaking down and there has been a continuous downgrading of their culture by non- adivasi oppressors. The final blow has come in the form of dam building on the river Narmada which seeks to destroy completely not only the Bhils' habitat but also, by displacing them into areas populated largely by non- adivasis, their unique culture.

The local stakeholder tree showing the power hierarchy has been pictured in Fig. 4 below -




Fig. 4: Local Stakeholder Tree for the Campaign Area

2.3 Problem Analysis

Coming to the specifics of the present campaign the most glaring

failure of planning with regard to the adivasis of western Madhya Pradesh has taken place in the sphere of the management of water resources. The proper way to go about managing the surface and sub-surface water flows in a river basin, especially in dry land areas is to start from the ridges of the topmost micro-watersheds that constitute the catchment of the river and then work down to the river itself (Shah, et al 1998). It is economically much cheaper, socially more just and environmentally much safer to do this than build big dams, which should only be constructed if necessary to service the needs that cannot be met through in situ water conservation and extraction.

Instead two large dams have been planned and are under construction on the rivers Narmada and Mahi, which will serve the non-*adivasi* people in control of the plains lands leaving the *adivasis* literally high and dry. Moreover, motorised Lift Irrigation Schemes (LIS) have been implemented on a large scale, ostensibly to make up for this injustice, with scant regard as to the sustained availability of water in streams and rivulets given the heavily deforested condition of the area and its adverse underlying rock structure. The sustained availability of adequate electric power to run the motors was also not considered. This short sightedness with regard to the future availability of water and power has led to these schemes having boomeranged adding further misery to the precarious livelihoods of the *Bhils*. It is these schemes, which underline the commoditisation of water and the marginalisation of the *Bhil adivasis* that are at the root of the problem of the inability to repay their loans.

There was a review in the year 1975 of the general failure of development in *adivasi* areas all over the country similar to that in the *Bhil* homeland in western Madhya Pradesh after which the Central Government introduced a new Tribal Sub Plan under which special programmes were started in the three crucial sectors of agricultural development, education and health (Sharma, 2001). The National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development was constituted in 1982 to give

a thrust to rural development and a new Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) was started to give subsidised loans to families living below the poverty line to start some income generating activity as a supplement or improve their agricultural incomes. A new scheme was started under this programme in Jhabua district in 1989 to improve the agriculture of the adivasis by providing them with enhanced irrigation facilities.

The scheme was kicked off in the southern Alirajpur Tehsil of Jhabua district and high power motors and accessories like HDPE pipelines were made available to draw water from streams and rivers on a community basis.

The expenses of taking water from streams and rivers to farms situated at a distance is relatively more than the economic capacity of an individual adivasi and so he is not able to avail of irrigation. That is why the loans available to individual adivasis under IRDP were pooled together and community lift irrigation schemes were started. It was also thought that this would lead to an increase in the cooperative endeavour among the adivasis.

The initial success of the scheme led to the district administration pushing the scheme on a large scale throughout the district. This is what led to the scheme being implemented in all the other tehsils. A decade after the implementation of the schemes it became clear that while there have been a few rare successes an overwhelming majority of them have been failures.

The adivasi members of the unsuccessful schemes consequently had a heavy debt burden on their shoulders and the Damocles sword of repayment of their huge debts or failing which forfeiture of their minimal landholdings hung over their heads. The serious extent of the problem can be gauged from the details of the failure and outstanding of LIS given in Table 4 below.

Table 4 : Indebtedness of Beneficiaries of Lift Irrigation Schemes in Jhabua

Category of Debtors	No. of Schemes	Sanctioned Investment (Rs Lakhs)			Outstanding Amount (Rs Lakhs)	Ratio of Outstanding/Initial Loan (%)	Avg. Outstanding per member (Rs)	Proportion of Total Number of Schemes (%)	Proportion of Total Outstanding Amount (%)
		Total	Grant Component	Loan Component					
More than Rs 10000 outstanding per member	301	967.59	458.06	509.55	1056.55	207.3	24012	35.16	80.1
Less than Rs 10000 outstanding per member	478	714.93	398.41	316.52	262.46	82.9	5563	55.84	19.9
No Outstanding	77	95.51	48.11	47.40	0	0	0	9.00	0
Total	856	1778.03	904.58	873.47	1319.01	-	-	-	-

Source : Compiled by Sampark from Records of Loaning Banks.

Apart from a handful of schemes all the others had become defunct and in an overwhelming 81 % of the schemes the loans were outstanding. The 9% who had been able to repay their loans had done so by rescheduling their loans through the Kisan Credit Card schemes so even though their LIS accounts had been squared they were still under debt in the latter scheme. A very high 80.1 % of the debtors were those with debts above Rs 10000 having an average outstanding amount of Rs 24012 each. Considering that most of these people had annual earnings of around ten to fifteen thousand rupees this was a high value indeed. This outstanding debt also meant that these poor adivasis were excluded from further access to cheap institutionalised debt and had to rely solely on the extortionate money lenders. What is

most disturbing is that a total investment of Rs 17 crores and 78 Lakhs had been made in 856 schemes over a seven years which had all gone down the drain without sustainably increasing the irrigation potential by even one hectare.

Several mass organisations of the Bhil adivasis had been agitating against various issues regarding their deprivation and marginalisation in Jhabua district from the early 1980s including in the form of the long drawn battle conducted by the Narmada Bachao Andolan against the construction of the Sardar Sarovar dam on the River Narmada (Rahul, 1997 op cit). The move by the administration to recover the dues on the failed LIS came as the last straw in a long line of illegalities and injustices committed against the adivasis. The Lok Jagriti Manch held a series of group meetings in villages throughout the district in 2004 to find out the real reasons for the failure of the LIS. These group meetings revealed that the main factors behind the failure of the schemes were -

1. The streams and even the Mahi River, which were the main water sources for the schemes had dried up after a few years in the crucial winter season when irrigation is most required because of the large number of LIS that came up on them and the continuing deforestation of the catchments. So most of the schemes had not worked after the first year or two while some had not worked at all.
2. The power supply to the motor pumps was highly irregular and of so low a voltage that the high power pumps either would not run at all or would get burnt out. Moreover from 1994 onwards there was a policy change by the government of providing free electricity to farmers using pumps with less than five horsepower motors and also providing grants for the digging of wells. So it became uneconomical to run the high powered motors of the LIS and most farmers opted for buying their own small motor pumps and developing their own wells instead. This in turn increased the load on the electricity distribution system further

- lowering the quality of power supplied.
3. Qualified engineers of the Government had not designed the schemes and instead the materials had been supplied on an ad hoc basis by the sahumars who had come to the villages and got the villagers together to apply for the scheme. The sahumars did all the paperwork and running around and handled all the money in cahoots with the loan advancing banks and the government officials. Thus the materials supplied were ill designed and of an inferior quality leading to the failure of the schemes. Neither was adequate training given to the adivasis to run the schemes properly.
 4. The loans that were thrust on the beneficiaries were far greater than their annual incomes and so represented a tremendous financial burden right from the start.

The central problem that confronted the campaign can thus be stated as follows -

The Bhil Adivasi beneficiaries of the Community Lift Irrigation Schemes were burdened with the unpaid debts arising from the loans thrust on them for the schemes which had never functioned properly due to faulty planning and implementation by the concerned government agencies and non- adivasi suppliers within the larger context of an inappropriate development policy for the area.

The Living Tragedy of Piplipada

"I had a small dugwell on my farm that used to give me some water to grow about a quintal of maize in the Rabi season. One day a trader from Petlawad came along with the Patwari of our village and told me that they were going to bring water from the Mahi river six kilometers away to the village and I would be able to grow tonnes and tonnes of maize and wheat" says Nathu Gangaram a Bhil adivasi of Piplipada village in Petlawad Tehsil of Jhabua district. He goes on to

say that the trader-patwari combination sold this dream to others in the village also adding that the whole of the money involved in implementing such an ambitious scheme would be provided by the Cooperative Bank in Jhaknavda under the Integrated Rural Development Programme of which 50% would be in the form of a grant and the rest would have to be paid back with subsidised interest.

Even though most of the decision makers in the ninetythree households were away in Gujarat having migrated seasonally for labour in the summer of 1996 the trader and patwari got the people remaining behind to sign on the loan documents on their behalf and so a massive plan to lift water from the Mahi river and bring it to Piplipada to irrigate about 200 hectares of land was set in motion. No engineer came to survey the terrain and design the water lift system. Instead the trader did the design himself and decided that three thirty horsepower motors would be needed and he also designed the pipeline system to bring the water to Piplipada. The people of the village contributed their hard labour to dig the trench for laying the pipeline and one fine day everything was ready for starting the lift system.

As soon as one of the motors was started the pressure of water gushing out burst the pipeline and so it had to be stopped immediately. The pipes had been so under-designed that they could not take the flow from even one thirty horsepower motor let alone all the three together. This led to a dispute between the trader and the villagers. Try as he might the trader could not set right the problem as every time the motor was started the pipeline would burst somewhere or other. Thus not a single drop of water came to Piplipada. The trader had employed an adivasi as chowkidar of the pumphouse prior to its handing over to the villagers. When the dispute increased he instigated this chowkidar to file a false

complaint with the police that the villagers were tampering with the motor of the pump and its starter so as to make the scheme unsuccessful. Later after getting all his bills cleared he withdrew from the scene altogether and the villagers of Piplipada were left with the burden of a combined loan of Rs 35 lakhs which later increased to around Rs 55 lakhs as the villagers could not pay anything due to the non-functioning of the Lift Irrigation System.

The inappropriateness of the scheme can be gauged from an analysis of the economic data of the loanee households. There are 9 landless, 20 marginal (0-1 ha), 46 small (1-2 ha), 17 semi-medium (2-4 ha) and 1 medium (4-10 ha) households as shown in Fig. 1 below. Thus 80% of the households are below the small farmer category and the average landholding size is only 1.6 hectares. All the semi-medium and the single medium farmer household are actually joint families. The average family size is a high 6.4 and so as shown in Fig. 2 the landholding per head is very low with the average being 0.26 hectares. There are only fourteen farmers who irrigate some of their land and the average irrigated area is a very low 0.9 hectares.




Fig. 1 : Land Distribution of Loanees




Fig. 2 : Landholding per capita (hectares)

The average annual income of the families is only Rs 9370 while the average principal of the LIS loan is Rs 38570 which gives a loan to income ratio as high as 4.7. No banker in his right senses is going to give out loans at such a high debt to income ratio. Yet in this case the loans were given which clearly indicates that corrupt practices were indulged in by the trader in collaboration with the patwari and the bank officials. The poor income situation of the loanees can also be gauged from the fact that on an average they spend five and half months a year in migratory labour outside their villages.

This is the most glaring example of the many cases of embezzlement of funds meant for the development of the adivasis under the Lift Irrigation Scheme. It shows active connivance between the bureaucracy and the traders to cheat the adivasis and also misuse development funds through unproductive corruption. The sufferers as always have been the adivasis who have been blacklisted and deprived of bank funds for more than a decade and half. Moreover the bank officials have from time to time confiscated goats, bullocks and poultry and all this has gone unrecorded. A living tragedy if ever there was one.

2.4 Objectives Analysis

The preceding analysis has systematically identified and categorised the various problems and their relation to each other as well as to the central problem. Now an analysis of the objectives of the campaign will be undertaken. The goal of the campaign was -

Gaining an immediate waiver of the debt of the Adivasis arising from the non-functioning of the Lift Irrigation Schemes and in the long run ensuring the institution of a more participatory, just, equitable and sustainable development policy for the upper

watershed dry land areas of the Bhil homelands in western Madhya Pradesh.

The problem analysis has clearly revealed that the central problem is closely related to various other problems that beset the Bhil adivasis and so this goal could be sustainably achieved only by fulfilling various objectives as follows -

1. Establishing the fact that the LIS had indeed failed due to the fault of government agencies and suppliers.
2. Establishing that the government was by its own laws and policies bound to shoulder the financial responsibility of this administrative failure on its part.
3. Establishing an alternative regime of natural resource management and agriculture in the area that is more sustainable and participatory.
4. Establishing the economic independence of the adivasis vis-a-vis the sahumars.
5. Establishing the political power of the adivasis so as to be able to put pressure on the government to waive the LIS debt in the short term and adopt more equitable and sustainable development policies in the long term.
6. Reviving the traditional social networks of the adivasis so as to rebuild their lost social capital and weaken harmful social practices.
7. Improving the status of women in Bhil society.
8. Improving the status of education and health services in the campaign area.

3. Strategy Analysis

Now that the goal of the project and the means of achieving them have been detailed it will be necessary to describe the strategies that have

been adopted for the achievement of these objectives. These strategies detailed below are all necessary for the success of the campaign as they are complementary to each other and together contribute to an overall programme of action of which mass mobilisation around rights issues is the centre piece.

3.1 Legal Advocacy

The most powerful legal provision in favour of the adivasis in the central Indian region are those of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution which has been hailed as the "Constitution within the Constitution" (Sharma, op cit). This provides for adivasi areas in a Fifth Schedule state like Madhya Pradesh being delineated as scheduled areas and the formation of a Tribes Advisory Council consisting of Scheduled Tribe legislators that is to advise the Governor of the state who has been given the responsibility for overseeing the administration of these scheduled areas. The relevant section 5 of the Schedule reads thus

- (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, The Governor may by public notification direct that any particular Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of the State shall not apply to a Scheduled Areas or any part thereof in the State or shall apply to a Scheduled Area or any part thereof in the State subject to such exceptions and modifications as he may specify in the notification and any direction given under this sub-paragraph may be given so as to have retrospective effect.
- (2) The Governor may make regulations for the peace and good government of any area in a State which is for the time being a Scheduled Area.

In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such regulations may

- a) Prohibit or restrict the transfer of land by or among members of the Scheduled Tribes in such area;

- b) Regulate the allotment of land to members of the Scheduled Tribes in such area;
 - c) Regulate the carrying on of business as money-lender by persons who lend money to members of the Scheduled Tribes in such area;
- (3) In making any such regulation as is referred to in sub-paragraph (2) of this paragraph, the Governor may repeal or amend any Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of the State or any existing law which for the time being applicable to the area in question.”

Thus theoretically it is possible for the Governor of a state on the advice of the Tribes Advisory Council to prevent the application of or repeal the Indian Forest Act and the Land Acquisition Act. However, this has never happened because it is not a binding provision and only a suggestion like the Directive Principles of State Policy, which finally has to depend on the executive for its implementation and since the adivasi elected representatives do not have the requisite political sagacity and power they have failed to pressurise the state into implementing this powerful provision.

One NGO Samatha fought the Government of Andhra Pradesh's decision of giving of a lease to a private company to extract minerals in scheduled adivasi areas all the way to the Supreme Court which in a landmark judgment rendered in the light of the debates in the Constituent Assembly upheld that the intention of the founders of the Constitution when drafting the Fifth Schedule was that the adivasis should be protected from dispossession of their land and so even though the actual word in the constitution is that the Governor “may” act for their benefit it should be read as “shall” and has thus effectively prevented the transfer of adivasi land to non-adivasis (Samatha v.State of Andhra Pradesh, 1997 8 SCC 191). Taking a cue from this definitive legal action of Samatha the activists of Sampark too found out from painstaking research that there existed in Madhya Pradesh a rule framed under the provisions of the Fifth Schedule that if the adivasis

were not being able to benefit from the loans advanced to them under various schemes because their planning and implementation were faulty then they would be relieved of the liability to repay these loans by the state.

The Madhya Pradesh Determination of Liability Rules 1979 were framed by the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes Welfare Department of the Government of Madhya Pradesh to be applicable in the Fifth Schedule adivasi areas in the state and it was acknowledged that - "Till the adivasis do not become familiar with the formalities and complexities of the working of the economic system it is necessary to protect them from unknown and unwarranted liabilities and there is a need to institute a higher level system for resolution of disputes regarding such liabilities between the simple adivasis and powerful financial institutions". These rules established such a procedure that if it could be proved conclusively that the adivasis are not responsible for the failure of the schemes then they would be freed from the liability of repaying the loans as a measure of social justice.

This crucial provision was picked up and made the fulcrum of the campaign for debt waiver. Thus the government was asked by the Lok Jagriti Manch to implement its own laws and rules as a matter of right of the adivasis and not just waiver the debt as a discretionary one time dole or welfare measure.

3.2 Mass Mobilisation

The most important strategy for implementation of this rule was that of mass action. An organisation of the debt affected adivasis was formed under the aegis of the Lok Jagriti Manch called the "Udvahan Sinchai Pidit Hitgrahi Sangh" in 2005. This organisation then organised meetings in the villages where there were farmers who had been affected by the failure of LIS and built up a big mass following. Then a programme of organising Gram Sabhas and getting resolutions passed regarding the failure of the LIS due to faulty implementation was

conducted and these were then submitted time and again to the district administration. Initially the district collector ignored these applications but when pressure began building up and he was accosted continuously in his field visits by angry farmers demanding action then he gave assurances of instituting enquiries but did nothing on the ground. Finally in January 2006 seventeen hundred affected farmers gathered together and signed an affidavit that they would commit mass suicide unless their unjust debt was waived and sent this to the President of India and the Governor and Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh. Eventually the Lok Jagriti Manch had to team up with other mass organisations from across Madhya Pradesh and organise a three day dharna in Bhopal in which thousands of farmers from across the state participated.

This led to the Chief Minister agreeing to meet the representatives of the farmers and in that meeting he gave an assurance that he would visit Jhabua and undertake a detailed review of the whole LIS implementation. Subsequently in May 2006 a massive rally of farmers was organised at the district headquarters in Jhabua in which thousands of farmers participated to put pressure on the administration to constitute an official committee under the rules for enquiring into the failure of LIS. This had a salutary effect and the process of identification and verification of genuine failures was begun.

The enquiry committee headed by Deputy Collector Shri P.S. Karma in his detailed report found the following reasons for the failure of the schemes -

1. The irrigation schemes were not designed by a technically competent agency.
2. No drawings were prepared for the schemes.
3. No written agreement was entered into by the administration with any competent implementing agency after a due process of tendering.

4. The work mostly commenced in the rainy season.
5. The adivasis were not trained or guided in the running of the schemes.
6. The Block officers did not monitor and evaluate the implementation of the schemes.
7. Even landless people were included in the beneficiary list.

The committee recommended that action be taken by administration against the sub-engineer who had the responsibility of design, monitoring and evaluation of the schemes and the trader turned supplier who had implemented the scheme. Thereafter the process of submission of resolutions passed by the Gram Sabhas endorsing the findings of the enquiry committee and recommending the waiver of the debt of the LIS beneficiaries began culminating in the waiver of debt. The Chief Minister on his tour of Jhabua in June 2007 ordered the lodging of criminal cases against the guilty officials and suppliers and with this the debt waiver campaign came to a successful end.

3.3 Participatory Research

The initial response of the government to the demands for debt waiver by the campaign was to put the blame on the adivasis. This is why it became necessary to undertake a rigorous study involving systematic data collection through a detailed questionnaire survey and statistical analysis to verify the reasons for the failure of LIS that could conclusively prove whether the adivasis had been responsible for their failure or not. Sampark along with the affected adivasis undertook this study. The limitations of time and resources meant that such a study could be carried out in one tehsil and that also only of a sample of schemes out of the total 81 schemes implemented in Petlawad tehsil.

A sample of nine schemes was chosen for deep study. For this the universe of 81 schemes was divided into three categories in accordance with their size - 28 schemes of beneficiaries numbering 12 or less, 28 schemes of beneficiaries numbering 13 to 20 and 25 schemes with

beneficiaries numbering 21 or more. This division according to size was most important because previous experience has shown that the technical and social problems increase with the size in such schemes. Three schemes from each of these categories were chosen. In addition to this the sample was chosen such that the social caste and income class distribution in the universe was reflected in it. The different water sources that is tanks, streams, dug wells were also adequately represented in the sample. There are two successful schemes one of the Bhil adivasis and the other of the backward farmer caste of Patidars and seven unsuccessful ones, which are mostly of Bhil adivasis and some dalits and Banjaras in the sample. There were a total of 279 families who received loans but due to various reasons 18 of them did not respond to the questionnaire survey and so the analysis has been carried out with the responses of 261 households only.

A statistical multiple linear regression analysis was carried out to determine the factors affecting the success or failure of the LIS. This showed that the irrigation source is by far the most important determinant of the success or failure of a scheme as the choice of a perennial source like a tank has led to success while the choice of the Mahi River or a seasonal stream has led to failure. This underlines the importance of proper water resource planning before undertaking a development scheme in semi arid and upper watershed regions. The Bhil adivasis traditionally used to do this with their intuitive knowledge of natural processes but the modern designers have not bothered to follow these eminently logical environmental principles in the lift irrigation schemes. The next most important factor is facilitator of the LIS loan. Where the government functionaries initiated the loan process and monitored its implementation the schemes were successful but where it was left to the sahuikars the schemes failed. The loan to income ratio too was an important factor as the higher this ratio the lesser was the chance of success. Finally the education levels of the beneficiaries were a factor as those who were illiterate could not

understand the new scheme and its operational requirements and no training was provided to them. The results are presented below in the form of a key-driver chart in Fig. 5.




Fig.5 : Key-drivers of Performance in Lift Irrigation Schemes

These results were published in the form of a booklet

and widely circulated to add analytical weight to the empirical findings of Sampark and this created extra pressure on the government on the issue.

3.4 Media Advocacy

The media showed tremendous enthusiasm to this serious swindling of small and poor farmers. In fact, the workers of the organisation not only organised the affected farmers, but also trained them to put their side effectively from different forums, with the result that whenever the affected beneficiaries of the failed-lift-irrigation project voiced their grievances through campaigns, they always invited the media and put their grievances before them with clarity. Conveying the grievances effectively to both electronic and print media was a well thought out strategy of the 'Lift Irrigation Project Unjust-Debt Waiver Movement'. The villagers and members of the Lok Jagriti Manch disclosed before the media, the inner shoddy story behind the improper and failed implementation of the lift irrigation project. The media immediately became interested in taking up this issue and consequently, this movement found good space in both electronic and print media and pressure on the government was on its way. When 1700 farmers

effected by unjust-debt requested the Honourable President of India either to waive this unjust-debt or grant permission to commit mass suicide, the national media made it a lead story. Further, Sampark made a documentary film 'Jeeti Jang Zindgi Ki' in association with independent media agency like Jansutra Samwad Samiti and through it gave wider publicity to the issue. Taking up this issue vigorously in radio, t.v. and newspapers was a successful effort on the front of media advocacy and resulting in pressuring the government.

3.5 Political Networking

This campaign would not have succeeded without taking recourse to political networking right from local to state and national level.

Lok Jagriti Manch formed a 'Asafal Udvahan Sichai Pariyojna Hitgrahi Sangh' (Unsuccessful Lift Irrigation Project Beneficiary Federation) and coordinated at local level with the Sarpanch Federation. Coordination was also there with N.G.O. Forum and Madhyanchal Forum and alliance was made with the Bhumandalikaran Virodhi Jan Abhiyan Network. Besides, unjust-debt waiver campaign was organised in the entire state with Beej Swaraj Abhiyan, Madhya Pradesh Kisan Sangharsha Samiti for unjust-debts of the farmers. The Lok Jagriti Manch also coordinated with those leaders of different political parties, who were interested in the issues of villagers and tribals. The result was that the issue of unjust-debts pertaining to the Lift Irrigation Projects, particularly farmer's debts was repeatedly raised in the State Legislative Assembly.

At national level, Sampark gathered people's support for this issue through Right to Food, Jalbiradari networks, succeeding in creating pressure on the government.

3.6 Rebuilding Social Capital

Experience has shown that mobilising people in small areas alone is not enough to ensure sustainability of the gains from organisational or development work without building up wider networks and

institutions that can create a positive counter-culture of change that can challenge the negative attitudes of those ranged against the emancipation of the poor at various levels (Yugandhar, 1999). Thus such wider networks have to be built up primarily through the creation of what has come to be called “social capital”(D'Silva & Pai, 2003). Thus Sampark has helped to revive the traditional community panchayats and through them by fixing lower rates for bride price and other donations that the bridegroom has to give to the bride's family at the time of marriage removed a major caused of indebtedness . Similarly the expenses for the Rakhi festival and rites of passage too have been reduced considerably. Moreover the traditional custom of labour pooling for agricultural operations has been revived thus saving on the monetary expenses of farming. This has resulted in greater social cohesion in support of the political mobilisation around rights issues.

3.7 Alternative Development Programmes

There was a rethinking in the beginning of the decade of the 1990s all over the country with regard to decentralised water resource management leading to the popularisation of the “ridge to valley” approach of watershed development as opposed to centralised basin level projects. This involved the active involvement of the beneficiaries in planning, implementation and post project maintenance of the created structures (Shah, 1993, GOI, 1994).

Sampark has engaged in the implementation of many comprehensive watershed development both with government and non-government funding the most important being the Comprehensive Watershed Development Project funded by the Danish International Development Agency implemented in collaboration with the Government of Madhya Pradesh which has brought about significant improvement in water availability and consequent livelihood security for the Bhils in the project villages at a cost of just Rs 5000 per hectare (CWDPMP, 2005). This project has conclusively proved that the environmental logic of the LIS was totally faulty and also provided a viable alternative mode of

natural resource management. Moreover by cooperating with the government Sampark also succeeded in countering some of the false propaganda of the local level administration that it was an anti-government organisation. Implementation of such development projects also provides the much needed financial security that normally does not come from doing just rights campaign work. Developmental work is thus an important support component of the overall strategy of any rights campaign without which the latter cannot attain sustainability.

3.8 Economic Cooperation

It has been established through practice that successful community based micro-finance is one of the more important desiderata for broadbased rural development (NABARD, 1999). Sampark has not only formed and efficiently run Self Help Groups with bank linkages but has also united them into a federation that now undertakes wholesale purchase of agricultural inputs and the sale of some of the outputs thus comprehensively denting the economic stranglehold of the sahumars over the adivasis and in the process limiting their political influence also.

3.9 Education and Health Programmes

The importance of education and health hardly needs underlining and Sampark not only has its own programmes in these spheres but also pressurises the government into improving the quality of its services.

3.10 Gender Development Programmes

All the strategies mentioned above have been informed with the understanding that women must participate equally with men in all development and rights based work. Apart from this there are specific programmes for the dark and silent area of women's own reproductive health and rights and consequently there is tremendous participation of women in the campaign and development work.

4. Impact

The biggest immediate impact is that the campaign has been successful in forcing the government to implement the The Madhya Pradesh Determination of Liability Rules 1979 for the first time in Madhya Pradesh. Eventhough the participants in the campaign were mostly in Petlawad tehsil the benefits of the debt waiver have been extended by the government to all the failed LIS implemented in Jhabua district.

In the process the impunity of corrupt government officials and the economic and political power of the sahlukars has been effectively challenged. Moreover, the development work carried out by Sampark has demonstrated a viable and sustainable alternative natural resource management paradigm to the faulty Lift Irrigation Schemes and also the centralised big dam systems. Under the democratic dispensation ordained by the Constitution of India the executive in India is charged with the responsibility of ensuring freedom, justice and equality to all its citizens by upholding the "rule of law" and especially so for adivasis living in scheduled areas. However, in reality the long history of poverty, illiteracy and social marginalisation of the Bhil adivasis has meant that they have been continually cheated since independence and been deprived of the fruits of development.

Thus the most important long term impact of the debt waiver campaign conducted by the Lok Jagriti Manch and the associated complementary development work of Sampark has been the effective establishment of the rule of law for the adivasis of Jhabua district.

5. Campaign Evaluation Matrix

The foregoing analysis has now provided us with enough facts and insights for the construction of the Campaign Evaluation Matrix (CEM) giving an overall summary of the objectives of the campaign, the

strategies of implementation, the assumptions on which it is based and the impacts of the project. The CEM for the campaign is given in Table 5 below -

Table 5: Campaign Evaluation Matrix

Narrative Summary	Strategy	Impact	Assumptions
OVERALL GOAL			
<p>Gaining an immediate waiver of the debt of the Adivasis arising from the non-functioning of the Lift Irrigation Schemes and in the long run ensuring the institution of a more participatory, just, equitable and sustainable development policy for the upper watershed dry land areas of the Bhil homelands in western Madhya Pradesh.</p>	<p>Combining mass mobilisation, advocacy, research, networking and development work to comprehensively address the related problems of deprivation and dis-empowerment of the Bhil adivasis that had given rise to the situation of unjust debt load of failed Lift Irrigation Schemes.</p>	<p>The campaign has achieved its immediate goal of debt waiver and also the long term goal of the establishment of the "Rule of Law" as ordained in the Constitution of India.</p>	<p>1. The common Bhil people will be sufficiently enthused by the aims of the campaign to agree to participate in it and fight for its success. 2. The government will fulfil its obligations under the constitution to protect the rights of Bhil adivasis.</p>
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES			
<p>1. Establishing the fact that the LIS had indeed failed due to the fault of government agencies and suppliers. 2. Establishing that the government was by its own laws and policies bound to shoulder the financial responsibility of this administrative failure on its part. 3. Establishing an alternative regime of natural resource management and agriculture in the area that is more sustainable and participatory. 4. Establishing the economic independence of the adivasis vis -a-vis the sahuakars.</p>	<p>1. Legal Advocacy - determining the progressive laws and rules and pressing for their implementation. 2. Mass Mobilisation - enthusing the masses to participate in putting pressure on the government to secure their rights. 3. Participatory Research - involving the people in the process of collection and analysis of data in support of their claims. 4. Media Advocacy - mobilising support from the print and electronic media. 5. Political Networking - gaining support from mainstream and alternative political formations from the local to the national level.</p>	<p>1. Laws and rules being implemented. 2. Lok Jagriti Manch active membership numbers in thousands. 3. Research successfully concluded and published. 4. Media support mobilised extremely well with all mainstream media covering the work of Lok Jagriti Manch and Sampark. 5. Links developed with politicians and mass organisations at all levels.</p>	<p>1. The same as for the overall goal above. 2. The educated Bhils will play a leading role in the implementation of these objectives. 3. Enlightened and altruistic non-advasis will come forward to support the campaign.</p>

Narrative Summary	Strategy	Impact	Assumptions
<p>5. Establishing the political power of the adivasis so as to be able to put pressure on the government to waive the LIS debt in the short term and adopt more equitable and sustainable development policies in the long term.</p> <p>6. Reviving the traditional social networks of the adivasis so as to rebuild their lost social capital and weaken harmful social practices.</p> <p>7. Improving the status of women in Bhil society.</p> <p>8. Improving the status of education and health services in the campaign area.</p>	<p>6. Rebuilding Social Capital - reviving the traditional social cohesiveness of Bhil adivasi communities.</p> <p>7. Alternative Development Programmes - implementing sustainable natural resource management projects</p> <p>8. Economic Cooperation - organising micro -finance and cooperative agricultural procurement and sale.</p> <p>9. Education and Health Programmes - improving the access to and quality of health and education services</p> <p>10. Gender Development Programmes - empowering women and ensuring their participation in all of the above.</p>	<p>6. Social cohesiveness restored in Bhili society and bride price and other festive costs reduced considerably. Customs of labour pooling also revived.</p> <p>7. Participatory and sustainable natural resource development programmes successfully implemented.</p> <p>8. SHGs formed, linked to banks and federated into a centralised agricultural procurement and selling agency.</p> <p>9. Alternative education and health services being provided.</p> <p>10. Women's participation achieved in all programmes and campaigns.</p>	

6. Future Plans

The basic logic of the campaign and development work conducted by the Lok Jagriti Manch and Sampark is sound and it needs to be replicated elsewhere in Madhya Pradesh so as to benefit adivasis. The whole process of the campaign has been an extremely educative experience for the people and the activists who participated in it. The process has also been documented very well. Thus a systematic training module will be developed from the learnings gained through the process so as to make it easier for others to replicate it and improve the situation of adivasis elsewhere. The publication of this impact analysis report is the first step in this exercise.

The Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas Act (PESA) provides a powerful legal basis for establishing the power of adivasi communities in Fifth Schedule Areas to determine the course of development and governance in their Gram Sabhas (Banerjee, 2006). The way ahead will

involve the implementation of the provisions of PESA and also the NREGA to establish a just, equitable and sustainable developmental regime in Fifth Schedule areas in Madhya Pradesh. This will require the design of strategies to counter the larger political economy of modern development and the concept of social capital alone is insufficient for this (Harris, 2001).

The local administration and the local power centres may have been successfully neutralised through the present campaign but unless this is replicated on a larger scale across dryland adivasi areas through a sustained political campaign there cannot be any widespread change in the developmental situation of the adivasis and such instances of mal-development as the Lift Irrigation Schemes may well be repeated again in future.



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